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 Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research and the Constitutionality of 
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment 
William B. McConnell10 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Diseases like juvenile-onset diabetes mellitus, Alzheimer's disease, and Parkinson's 
disease "result from the death or dysfunction of just one or a few cell types."1 The advent of 
human embryonic stem cell (hESC) line technology offers great promise to treat such diseases by 
providing a source of replacement cells? The brief history of hESC research, however, has been 
wrought with controversy due to the methods by which the cells are derived, such that 
legislative, executive, and legal efforts have substantially stymied hESC research progress.3 
This note discusses the efforts to hinder hESC research, but focuses specifically on the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment which forbids the use of federal funds for any research that creates 
human embryos, destroys human embryos, or subjects human embryos to risk of injury or death.4 
This note begins by looking at the science behind hESC research and compares it to alternative 
forms of stem cell research. This note then examines the controversy surrounding hESC 
research and some of the arguments against conducting such research. The focus then shifts to 
executive, legislative, and judicial efforts to hinder hESC research. This note then reviews the 
Establishment Clause under the First Amendment and the relevant tests that courts have utilized 
to analyze whether Government statutes and policies violate the Establishment Clause. 
la B.A., Biology, University of Virginia, 2004; M.S., Biology-Genetics, University of Virginia, 
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1 James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived From Human Blastocysts, 282 
SCI. 1145, 1147 (1998). 
2 Jd. 
3 See Shannon McGuire, Embryonic Stem Cells: Marrow of the Dickey Matter, 11 J. HIGH TECH. 
L. 160, 181 (2010). 
4 OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2009, Pub.L. No. 111- 8, § 509(a)(2), 123 Stat. 524, 803; see 
---------aal~s~Qsn · 9~~bC~.c~k~.~2w0+11~)~.----------------------------------
1 
Thereafter, this note specifically examines ·whether the Dickey-Wicker .Amendment violates the 
Establishment Clause using the Supreme Court's endorsement test. Endorsement test analysis 
suggests the Amendment unconstitutionally advances the Roman Catholic and Protestant belief 
that personhood or life begins at conception. 5 Because the Dickey-Wicker Amendment may 
violate the fundamental freedom that Government "shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion," this note reviews the Amendment subject to strict scrutiny analysis.6 
As a result of the above analyses, this note supports the conclusion that the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment violates the Establishment Clause and fails judicial review subject to strict scrutiny 
analysis. 
II. SCIENCE AND CONTROVERSY 
A. Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research 
Human embryonic stem cells are distinguished by three characteristics: (1) derivation 
from a blastocyst-stage human embryo, (2) the ability to replicate indefinitely while remaining 
undifferentiated, and (3) pluripotency, the potential to develop into any cell type in the body? 
The blastocyst-stage of a human embryo is typically reached between five and six days after 
fertilization of the egg when the embryo is spherical and consists of little more than a single 
germ layer surrounding an inner cavity. 8 The most widely used method for harvesting hESCs 
5 See James F. Childress, An Ethical Defense of Federal Funding for Human Embryonic Stem 
Cell Research, 2 YALEJ. HEALTHPOL'YL. & ETHICS 157,161-62 (2001). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7 THOMSON, supra note 1, at 1145. 
8 See Blastocyst embryo grading pictures and photos from IVF, In Vitro Fertilization. Advanced 
Fertility Center of Chicago (last visited Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.advancedfertility.com/ 
blastocystimages.htm. 
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from the blastocyst necessarily results in the destruction of the embryo, a process that has stirred 
the ethical controversy behind hESC research.9 
Advanced Cell Technology, Inc. ("ACT") received a patent in February 2011 for a 
proprietary new technique the company claims allows for the derivation ofhESC lines without 
destroying the embryos. 10 The method, referred to as the "single-blastomere" technique, was 
frrst published in 2006. 11 While the technique appears promising, it has come under criticism 
and is little used because of ACT's method patent. 12 
Because of the controversy surrounding hESC research, there has been a push to explore 
other avenues of stem cell research. Some alternative stem cell platforms include adult stem 
cells, perinatal stem cells, and stem cells bioengineered through somatic cell nuclear transfer 
(SCNT), and induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells.13 These alternatives, however, are deficient in 
ways that hESCs are not. Notably, hESCs are truly pluripotent such that they can develop into 
any cell type in the body, whereas adult stem cells are multi potent, or limited in cell type 
differentiation, which limits research and therapeutic applications using adult stem cells. are. 14 
Adult stem cells are also difficult to isolate from tissue and culture, whereas hESCs are relatively 
9 See David G. Zacharias, et al., The Science and Ethics of Induced Pluripotency: What Will 
Become of Embryonic Stem Cells?, MAYOCLIN. PROC. 634, 637 (2011). 
10 ADVANCED CELL TECHNOLOGY, PRESS RELEASES, 2/23/11: ACT Secures Patent to Generate 
Embryonic Stem Cells Without Embryo Destruction, available at http://www.advancedcell.com/news-
and-media!press-releases/act-secures-patent-to-generate-embryonic-stem-cells-without -embryo-
destruction!index.asp. 
11 See Irina Klimanskaya, Young Chung, Sandy Becker, Shi-Jiang Lu & Robert Lanza, Human 
Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Derived.from Single Blastomeres, 444 NATURE 481,481 (2006); see also 
Chung et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Generated without Embryo Destruction, 2 CELL STEM 
CELL. CORRESPONDENCE 1, 1 (2008). 
12 See e.g. id. (demonstrating low efficiency rates compared to the standard method for deriving 
hESC lines and failing to demonstrate that biopsied blastocysts survive beyond the blastocyst stage of 
embryonic development). 
13 ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 635-36. 
14 See Patricia A. Zuk, et al., Human Adipose Tissue is a Source ofMultipotent Stem Cells, 13 
MOL. DIOL. CELL. 4279,4292-93 (2002). 
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easy to isolate from blastocysts and culture. 15 The drawback of utilizi11.g perinatal stem cells 
collected from umbilical cord blood and amniotic fluid is that they are only multipotent, not 
pluripotent like hESCs.16 Stem cells bioengineered through SCNT are "better suited for disease 
development research than therapeutic application because reprogramming a cell's genome is 
correlated with health problems in cloned animals."17 Induced pluripotent stem cells show great 
promise in that they demonstrate true pluripotency, but "not all iPS cells generated to date have 
demonstrated longitudinal functional equivalence to hESCs because of the lack of long-term 
follow-up studies.18 Moreover, the retroviral vectors used to reprogram the iPS cells may cause 
cancer, depending on where the vectors randomly insert themselves in the genome, with the 
result that iPS cells currently cannot be used clinically .19 
Although these alternative forms of stem cells exist with similar qualities and similar 
potentials for medical advances, hESCs are widely regarded as the "gold standard" within the 
research field because the other sources of stem cells are not necessarily viable options for 
clinical research and therapeutic applications.20 Renowned iPS cell researcher Juan Carlos 
Izpisua Belmonte is quoted as saying: "[Embryonic stem] cells are needed to understand the 
basic mechanism of pluripotency and self-renewal. As such, it is out of the question to even 
suggest phasing them out. We will be lost without them."21 
Human embryonic stem cell research shows great promise to elucidate ~'developmental 
events that cannot be studied directly in the intact human embryo but that have important 
15 Jd. 
16 ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 635. 
17 MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 184. 
18 ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 637. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. at 635. 
21 Belmo~te JC, et al., Induced pluripotent stem cells and reprogramming: seeing the science 
through the hype. 10 NAT REV GENET. 878, 878 (2009). 
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consequences in clinical areas, including birth defects, infertility, and pregnancy loss. "22 
Knowledge of normal human development during the early post-implantation period is 
particularly limited because it is confmed to knowledge gained from the study of a limited 
number of sectioned human embryos and ~'analogies drawn from the experimental embryology 
of other species," like the mouse.23 Research using hESCs may be particularly valuable for the 
study of development and tissue function as it differs between mice and humans.24 Research 
using hESCs may also be utilized to identify new genes using screens based on the in vitro 
differentiation of hESCs to certain cell fates. 25 Such genes might be used for tissue regeneration 
therapies, as targets for new drugs, or as targets for teratogenic compounds.Z6 Finally, once the 
mechanisms of differentiation are deciphered, "large, purified populations of euploid human 
cells such as cardiomyocytes and neurons will provide a potentially limitless source of cells for 
drug discovery and transplantation therapies."27 
B. Controversy 
When a human sperm and ova unite, their chromosomes combine to form a unique 
human being capable of developing from a zygote to a blastocyst to an embryo, then fetus, 
neonate, infant, child, adolescent, and adult.28 "Some argue that the zygote or blastocyst does 
not constitute a [person] because each lacks the differentiated cells and tissues characteristic of 
human beings. "29 Some argue that the early blastocyst, embryo, and fetus forms of a human 
22 THOMSON, supra note 1, at 1146. 
23ld. 
24Jd. 
25 ld. 
26Jd. 
27 THOMSON, supra note 1, at 1146-47. 
28 Robert D. Orr, M.D., C.M. and C. Christopher Hook, M.D., Stem Cell Research: Magical 
Promise v. Moral Peril. 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 189, 191. 
29 Jd. 
5 
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argue that life (or personhood) begins immediately upon the union of sperm and egg. 31 
Opponents ofhESC research typically subscribe to the latter two arguments and object to 
the research because harvesting hESCs inevitably results in destruction of the human blastocysts 
from which hESCs are derived?2 Under the "potential person" argument, destruction of 
blastocyst-stage embryos equates to the destruction of potential people who would develop into 
adults if the embryos were implanted in would-be mothers. Under the "personhood at 
conception" argument, destruction of blastocyst-stage embryos constitutes murder of a person. 
Correspondingly, opponents of hESC research feel that it is morally and ethically reprehensible 
to destroy human blastocyts for the purpose of harvesting hESCs to advance science and medical 
treatment. 33 
Different religious perspectives on the morality ofhESC derivation flow from the 
differing premises about the moral status of the early embryo existing outside a woman's 
womb.34 Roman Catholocism officially opposes hESC research because the church holds that 
life begins at conception such that the destruction of an extracorporeal embryo amounts to 
murder.35 Similarly, Protestant theologians generally hold that moral life begins at conception 
such that they oppose the destruction of human blastocyts for the collection ofhESCs.36 Jewish 
theologians, however, hold that life begins at birth and an embryo outside the body lacks 
standing in Jewish law such that hESC research is permissible.37 Similarly, most Muslim, 
3o Id. 
31 See id. 
32 ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 637. 
33 G Me UIRE, supra note 3, at 181. 
34 CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 160. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
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Hindu, or Buddhist communities do not hold that moral life begins at conception. 38 
Representatives from the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter Day Saints (Mormons), on the 
other hand, hold a neutral view of hESC research. 39 Mormon politicians have traditionally 
supported federal funding for hESC research while remaining "pro-life" and rejecting a woman's 
fundamental right to an abortion.40 
Some of the staunchest opponents ofhESC research grant moral status to human embryos 
and seek to protect human embryos under the law. One of the most recent efforts to protect 
human embryos occurred in Mississippi, where Initiative 26 was voted upon on November 8, 
2011.41 The initiative sought to amend the state's constitution to declare that legally protectable 
life begins at conception.42 The initiative was supported by the state's largest Christian 
denomination, the Mississippi Baptist Convention.43 Initiative 26 was also supported by 
Personhood USA, a Colorado-based group that has pushed similar initiatives in Florida, 
Montana, Ohio, and Oregon. 44 Critics of Initiative 26 noted that its passage would legally 
prohibit birth control methods like intrauterine devices (IUDs) and the morning after pi11.45 
Ultimately, the initiative was rejected by more than fifty five percent of voters. 46 
Opponents of hESC research support that hESC research should be abandoned in favor of 
alternative stem cell research platforms because the alternatives do not present the same moral 
38 Ronald M. Green, Political Interventions in U.S. Human Embryo Research: An Ethical 
Assessment, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 220,226 (2010). 
39 CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 160. 
40 Id. at 160-61. 
41 Mississippi Defeats Life at Conception Ballot Initiative, Fox NEWS (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://www .foxnews.com/politics/20 11 /11/08/mississippi-defeats-life-at -conception-ballot-initiative/ 
42 !d. 
43 Jd. 
44 Id. 
45 Jd. 
46 ]J. 
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ru,d ethical dilemma as hESC derivation.47 Opponents note that tissue compatibili't'J poses a 
significant technical obstacle to the clinical application ofhESCs.48 In this regard, opponents 
suggest that adult stem cells may be more clinically useful than hESCs.49 Further, opponents 
emphasize that adult stem cells have yielded success in treatments for a variety of diseases where 
hESCs have yet to demonstrate therapeutic use in humans. 50 
Ill. CURRENT REGULATION 
A. The Executive Orders 
President George W. Bush issued Executive Order number 13,435 on August 9, 2001 
limiting federal funding on stem cell research to sixty existing hESC lines, reasoning that "the 
life and death decision [had] already been made" for the embryos destroyed to make the lines, so 
no moral line would be crossed. 51 Outside of those existing hESC lines, the Bush Executive 
Order forbade the Department of Health and Human Services and consequently the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) from conducting research on any new hESC lines that would require 
the destruction of human embryos. 52 
On March 9, 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order No. 13,505, revoking 
President Bush's August 9, 2001 directive and permitting federal funding of''scientifically 
worthy" stem cell research, including hESC research to "the extent permitted by law."53 In his 
Order, President Obama recognizes the potential ofhESC research, stating: 
47 Richard M. Doerflinger, The Ethics of Funding Embryonic Stem Cell Research: A Catholic 
Viewpoint, 9 KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS J. 137, 143 (1999) (discussing the advantages of alternative 
methods of deriving stem cells). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 635. 
51 See Exec. Order No. 13,435, 72 Fed. Reg. 34,591 (June 20, 2007); George W. Bush, President 
of the United States, President Discusses Stem Cell Research (Aug. 9, 2001). 
52 See id. 
53 See Exec. Order No. 13,505,74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (March 9, 2009). 
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Research involving human embryonic stem cells and human non-embryonic stem 
cells has the potential to lead to better understanding and treatment of many 
disabling diseases and conditions. Advances over the past decade in this 
promising scientific field have been encouraging, leading to broad agreement in 
the scientific community that the research should be supported by Federal funds. 
For the past 8 years, the authority of the Department of Health and Human 
Services, including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), to fund and conduct 
human embryonic stem cell research has been limited by Presidential actions. The 
purpose of this order is to remove these limitations on scientific inquiry, to expand 
NIH support for the exploration of human stem cell research, and in so doing to 
enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new discoveries and 
new therapies for the benefit of humankind. 54 
The Order also directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to issue new 
guidelines to allow hESC research promulgated by the NIH "to the extent permitted by law."55 
The result of President Obama' s Executive Order is that there are currently no hindrances upon 
hESC research stemming from the Executive Branch of government. 
B. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment 
1. Description 
While there is currently no resistance against hESC research from the Executive Branch 
of government, there is active resistance from the Legislative Branch. Two days after mandating 
the March 9, 2009 Order, President Obama signed the Omnibus Appropriations Act of2009 into 
law, including what is commonly referred to as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.56 
The Dickey-Wicker prohibits the NIH from funding: 
(1) the creation of a human embryo or embryos for research purposes; or (2) 
research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed, discarded, or 
knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than that allowed for 
research on fetuses in utero under 45 C.F.R. 46.204(b) and section 498(b) of the 
Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)).57 
54ld. 
55 Id. 
56 See§ 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 3280-81 
57 ld. 
9 
The Dickey= \Vicker i-\.mend.~ent has been included in a..11...11ual appropriations bills since 
1996 during the Clinton Administration. 58 The plain language of the Amendment codifies the 
condition that no federal funds may be made available for hESC research that either creates 
human embryos, destroys human embryos, or subjects human embryos to risk of injury or 
death. 59 The Amendment defmes "human embryo or embryos" to "include any organism, not 
protected as a human subject under 45 C.F.R. § 46 as of the date of enactment of this Act, that is 
derived by fertilization, parthenogenesis, cloning, or any other means from one or more human 
gametes. "60 
The Dickey-Wicker Amendment was included in the budget bill in 1996, two years 
before the advent ofhESC lines by James A. Thomson in 1998.61 At that time, the policy 
rationale of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment concerned stem cell research as it pertained to 
cloning, in vitro fertilization (IVF), and SCNT.62 Despite changes in the science of stem cell 
research, the language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment has remained virtually unchanged 
since it was approved in 1996, and it has been attached to every appropriations bill for funding of 
the Department of HHS since then. 63 As a rider to an appropriations bill, the original 
Amendment had only a single year of effectiveness, but its inclusion in the federal appropriations 
58 See I. Glenn Cohen, J.D. & Eli Y. Adashi, M.D., Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research under 
Siege- Battle Won but Not the War, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2011). 
59 § 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 3280-81; see also Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 390 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011). 
60 § 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 3281. 
61 See Balanced Budget Downpayment Act 1, Pub. L. No. 1 04-99, § 128, 11 0 Stat. 26 ( 1996); 
Thomson, et al., supra note 1, at 1145-47. 
62 See Owen C.B. Hughes, Alan L. Jakimo & Michael 1. Malinowski, United States Regulation of 
Stem Cell Research: Recasting Government's Role and Questions to be Resolved, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
383, 400-01 (2008). 
63 Anne Clark Pierson, Sherley v. Sebelius: Circuit Court Allows Federal Funding of Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research to Continue for Now, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 875, 873 (201 0). 
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laws every year since it was adopted has virtually converted the Dickey-Wicker Amendment into 
"a de facto law without termination."64 
The Amendment's current language absolutely bans the destruction of human embryos 
for research purposes, effectively forbidding researchers from using federal money to create new 
hESC lines.65 It is unrealistic for American researchers to develop innovative hESC-based 
therapies without greater access to viable stem cell lines, particularly when only 136lines are 
currently available for use by researchers with NIH :funding.66 Private investments and certain 
state funds may be used to create embryonic stem cell lines, but even when private funding is 
used to create a new stem cell line, those hESCs may not be utilized in projects that receive 
federal funding. 67 
2. Litigation 
After President Obama's revocation of Bush Executive Order 13,435 and subsequent 
revision of hESC protocols by the Secretary of HHS, the NIH requested public comment on draft 
guidelines.68 The proposed guidelines allowed federal funding of research using hESCs derived 
from blastocyst-stage embryos created for reproductive purposes but no longer needed for that 
purpose.69 The NIH received nearly 50,000 comments in response to their request for public 
comment.70 
64 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 407. 
65 § 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 3280-81; see also Sherley, supra note 59, at 390. 
66 NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 
Nlli HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL REGISTRY, http:/!http://grants.nih.gov/stem_cells/registry/ 
current.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2011). 
67 Claudia Kalb, A New Stem Cell Era, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 9, 2009), archived at 
http://www.webcitation.org/5tGDwwtyA. 
68 Sherley v. Sebelius, 776 F.Supp.2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2011). 
69 ld. at 8. 
70 Id. at 8. 
11 
Responding to the corr.Jnents seeking clarification, the l'ITH presented its interpretation of 
the Dickey-Wicker Amendment as not prohibiting federal funding for hESC research.71 
Specifically, the NIH stated that hESCs are not "embryos" under the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment such that the Amendment does not forbid hESC research.72 Moreover, the NIH 
distinguished between hESC research and the derivation of hESCs from embryos. The NIH's 
stance is that derivation of hESCs results in destruction of embryos and is forbidden by the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment?3 However, hESC research in and of itself does not result in the 
destruction of human embryos, so the Dickey-Wicker Amendment does not forbid hESC 
research. 74 
A legal challenge to the Guidelines was filed immediately in the District Court for the 
District of Columbia. 75 Christian Adoption Agency, Christian Medical Association, ~mbryos, 
adoptive parents, and two adult stem cell researchers filed suit "to enjoin the Secretary of [HHS] 
from implementing and applying guidelines" for hESC research promulgated by the NIH. 76 The 
action and preliminary injunction on hESC research were dismissed by Judge Lamberth of the 
District Court on the basis of insufficient injury for standing and mootness. 77 In a decision 
composed by Judge Ginsburg, the Court of Appeals reversed the order of the district court and 
reinstated the motion for a preliminary injunction. 78 The Court concluded that Drs. Sherley and 
Deisher, the two adult stem cell researchers, possessed standing because they suffered an actual 
injury due to increased competition for a fixed amount of available federal funding for general 
71 Id. at 8. 
72 Id. at 8. 
73 Sherley, supra note 68, at 8. 
74 See id. 
75 See Sherley v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing the events that led up to 
the initial legal challenge brought by plaintiffs). 
76 Id. 
11 Id. 
78 Id. 
12 
stem cell research?9 Given that plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction was ripe 
following the Court of Appeals reversal, the District Court found that "the likelihood of success 
on the merits, irreparable harm to plaintiffs, the balance of the hardships, and public interest each 
weigh[ ed] in favor of a preliminary injunction."80 On appeal by defendants, the Court of 
Appeals lifted the preliminary injunction, holding that "plaintiffs [were] unlikely to prevail 
because Dickey Wicker is ambiguous and the NIH seems reasonably to have concluded that, 
although Dickey Wicker bars funding for the destructive act of deriving [hESCs] from 
[embryos], it does not prohibit funding a research project in which [hESCs] will be used."81 On 
remand, the District Court, on July 27,2011, held that the NIH's determination that funding 
hESC research comports with the Dickey-Wicker Amendment because embryonic stem cells are 
not "human embryos" was a permissible interpretation of the statute. 82 The Court determined 
that the NIH was entitled to Chevron deference, which requires judicial deference to an agency 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute as long as the interpretation reflects a "permissible 
construction of the statute."83 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DICKEY-WICKERAMENDMENT UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the enactment of any law 
"respecting an establishment of religion."84 Traditionally, the Court has utilized the three-part 
Lemon test to analyze whether legislation comports with the mandate of the Establishment 
79 Id. 
80 Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F.Supp.2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 201 0). 
81 Sherley, supra note 59, at 389-90. 
82 See Sherley, supra note 68, at 6. 
83 Id. at 10 (citing Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
84 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
13 
Clause. 85 The statute in question must (1) have been adopted v1ith a secular pu..rpose, (2) vvith a 
primary effect "that neither advances nor inhibits religion," and (3) the statute "must not result in 
an excessive entanglement of government with religion."86 Violation of any one of the three 
prongs of the Lemon test indicates that the statute in question violates the Establishment 
Clause.87 
The Court has more recently implemented use of the endorsement test. 88 The 
endorsement test questions whether a "reasonable hypothetical observer" would think that the 
government is either endorsing or disapproving of religion by enacting the statute in question. 89 
"The endorsement test recognizes that when government transgresses the limits of neutrality and 
acts in ways that show religious favoritism or sponsorship, it violates the Establishment 
Clause."90 The endorsement test is developed from the "prohibition against government 
endorsement of religion" and it "'preclude[s] government from conveying or attempting to 
convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred '"91 In one 
of the more recent federal cases involving the Establishment Clause, Kitzmiller v. Dover Area 
School Dist., the court opted to utilize both tests, first applying the endorsement test and then 
applying the Lemon test.92 1bis note, however, will focus solely on application of the 
endorsement test because the two tests largely overlap. 
85 Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987). 
86 Jd. at 583 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
87 Id. 
88 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Cnty. of 
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (demonstrating the frrst time the majority of the Supreme Court 
implemented the endorsement test). . 
89 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,308 (2000). 
90 See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F.Supp.2d 707, 714 (2005). 
91 Allegheny, supra note 88 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
92 See Kitzmiller, supra note 90, at 714. 
14 
Here, the central issue is whether the government has endorsed Christianity by banning 
federal funding for research that results in the destruction of human embryos. In addressing this 
issue, one must examine what the government intended to communicate and what the 
government actually communicated.93 One must determine what message the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment conveys to a reasonable, objective observer who knows the policy's language, 
origins, and legislative history, as well as the history of the community and the broader social 
and historical context in which the policy arose. 94 The Third Circuit elaborated further in 
Modrovich v. Allegheny County, Pa. that "the reasonable observer is an informed citizen who is 
more knowledgeable than the average passerby ."95 The reasonable observer is also deemed able 
to "glean other relevant facts" about the Government action and its history from the face of the 
action in light of its context. 96 
"Knowing the challenged policy's legislative history, the community's history, and the 
broader social and historical context in which the policy arose, the objective observer [should 
consider] the publicly available evidence relevant to the purpose inquiry, but notably [should] 
not do so to ascertain, strictly speaking, what the governmental purpose actually was."97 Rather, 
the observer should examine the evidence to determine whether the policy "conveys a message 
of endorsement or disapproval" of religion, irrespective of the government's intent. 98 
A. Application of the Endorsement Test 
93 I d. at 714 (citing Lynch, supra note 88, at 690). 
94 Jd. (citing McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that an objective 
observer is "presumed to be familiar with the history of the government's actions and competent to learn 
what history has to show); Santa Fe, supra note 89, at 308 (holding that an objective observer is familiar 
with "implementation of' the governmental action at issue); Selman v. Cobb, 390 F.Supp.2d 1306 
(holding that an objective observer is "familiar with the origins and context of the government-sponsored 
message at issue and the history of the community where the message is displayed")). 
95 Modrovich v. Allegheny Cnty., Pa., 385 F.3d 397, 407 (2004). 
96ld. 
97 Kitzmiller, supra note 90 at 715 (citing Selman, supra note 94, at 1306-07). 
98 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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1. Legislative history of the Dickey= Wicker Amendment and the 
broader social and historical context in which the Amendment arose 
This history of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment traces back to ~then President Clinton 
first took office as President of the United States. Shortly after assuming his post in 1993, 
President Clinton selected Nobel Laureate Harold Varmus as the newNlH director.99 Director 
Varmus was determined to revitalize the NIH's study ofhuman fetal tissue and stem cell biology 
because he recognized the vast potential for medical advances in those particular ftelds. 100 Dr. 
V arm us ensured that the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 ("NIHRA") 
included provisions to promote fetal tissue and stem cell research. The NIHRA was also 
amended to abolish the requirement that the Ethics Advisory Board, which was no longer in 
existence, review IVF research proposals.101 Dr. V arm us substituted the old review process for a 
new one that required the Secretary of HHS to "apply the same risk standard in assessing 
research proposals for fetuses."102 The purpose of applying this risk standard was to protect 
unsuspecting women and their fetuses from unethical manipulation.103 
The NIH's Human Embryo Research Panel reported its conclusions in September 1994 
that federal funds should be provided for research that utilizes excess preimplantation 
embryos. 104 Further, because studies requiring fertilization of eggs were necessary to address 
fundamental questions in reproductive medicine, the Panel found it would be unwise to proscribe 
altogether research on the fertilization and development of oocytes (immature eggs ).105 The 
Advisory Committee to the Director ofNIH unanimously accepted the conclusions of the 
99 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 405. 
100 ld. 
101 ld. 
102ld. 
103 ld. 
104 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 405. 
105 !d. at 405. 
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Panel. 106 President Clinton, however, disregarded the conclusions and on December 2, 1994, 
specifically rejected federal funding for creating embryos for research. 107 
Several Congressional representatives were concerned that President Bush's December 2, 
1994 presidential directive only opposed the use of federal funds to create human embryos for 
research purposes.108 These representatives sought also to prohibit the use of federal funds for 
using excess preimplantation human embryos to create pluripotent celllines. 109 Protestant, 
conservative, Republican, ''pro-life" Representatives Jay Dickey and Roger Wicker were among 
those concerned Congressmen, and they authored a rider Amendment to the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act in response.110 Their lobbying efforts ultimately led to the adoption of what 
became known as the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. 111 
The "normative debate storm clouds over stem cell research" were gathering long before 
President Bush's Executive Order 13,435.112 The clouds had been present at least as early as 
President Clinton's reaction to the announcement that the first cloned mammal (Dolly, the sheep) 
had been produced through SCNT .113 Dolly had been cloned using SCNT by a team led by Ian 
Wilmut at the Roslin Institute in Scotland in 1997.114 
106 I d. at 406. 
107 !d. at 406. 
108 !d. at 406. 
109 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 406. 
110 See Biography, ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR, http://wicker.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutRoger.Biography (last visited Oct. 31, 2011); See also About Roger 
Wicker, ROGER WICKER, U.S. SENATOR, http://wickerforsenate.com/about (last visited Nov. 26, 2011); 
See Rep. Jay Dickey, Summary, LEGISTORM, http://www.legistorm.com/personlbio/66815/ 
Jay_ W _Dickey_Jr_.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011); See also, ON THE ISSUES (Nov. 7, 2000), Jay 
Dickey on Principles and Values, http://www.ontheissues.org/House/ 
Jay_Dickey_Principles_ + _ Values.htm 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 411. 
113 !d. at 411-12. 
114 Ian Wilmut et al., Viable Offspring Derived from Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells, 385 
NATURE 810, 812 (1997). 
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Public and political reactions to Dolly's birth afu~ouncement "illustrated the iru"late 
entanglement between SCNT cloning used for research purposes and SCNT used for 
reproductive purposes."115 This entanglement is reflected in the following excerpt from the 
March 28, 2001 White House press briefmg on the topic of cloning: 
Secretary Ari Fleischer: 
MR. FLEISCHER: Well, you know the President's position on stem cells. 
Q: No, I know his position on embryonic stem cells. I don't know his position on cloning. 
MR. FLEISCHER: But that's not a cloning issue. You just heard the President's position on 
cloning of humans. That's the President's position. 
Q: What about cloning human cells? 
MR. FLEISCHER: I'm not aware of the distinction between the issue of cloning human beings 
and cloning human cells.116 
Dolly's tremendous press coverage also contributed heavily to a public hysteria that 
scientists would begin to "play God" and interfere with the natural order of life, robbing "future 
individuals of the right to a unique identity" by cloning human beings using SCNT .117 
The press coverage afforded Dolly also bolstered the widespread public perception that cloning 
solely meant the use of scientific techniques to produce exact copies of an entire biological 
creature, not just cells. 118 Scientists, on the other hand, also use the term cloning restrictively to 
mean using blastocysts in order to derive pluripotent stem celllines. 119 
2. ~/hat the Government intended to communicate and what the 
Government actually communicated 
115 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 413-14. 
116 Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec'y, Press Briefmg by Ari Fleischer (Mar. 28, 2001). 
117 KathiE. Hanna, Cloning/Embryonic Stem Cells, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 
NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Apr. 2006), http://www.genome.gov/ 10004765. 
118 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 415. 
119 Id. 
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The plain language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment forbids the use of federal funds for 
any research that creates human embryos, destroys human embryos, or subjects human embryos 
to risk of injury or death. 120 Looking at the language of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment with 
reference to 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) and 42 U.S. C.§ 289(g)(b), one may draw two conclusions: 
(1) Congress accorded the same degree of protection to human embryos under Dickey-Wicker as 
accorded to human fetuses in utero "intended to be carried to term" under 45 C.F.R. § 46.204(b) 
and section 498(b) of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 289g(b)); and (2) Congress 
sought to restrict both present and future stem cell research beyond the scientific technology in 
existence in 1996 through the language "or any other means from one or more human gametes or 
human diploid cells" under Division F, Section 509 (b) of the 2009 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act.121 This language captures the use of blastocyst-stage embryos for the derivation ofhESCs 
because the process results in the destruction of the embryos. 
In April2011, the D.C. Circuit in Sherley found the language of the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment to be ambiguous with regard to the word "research" and whether hESC research 
resulted in the destruction of human embryos. The D.C. Circuit stated that the term "research" is 
"flexible enough to describe either a discrete project or an extended process," a fact that 
reinforced the Court's "conclusion that the text is ambiguous."122 Despite the Court's finding of 
ambiguity in what the government actually communicated, it appears that the Government 
intended the language of the Amendment to be read broadly. The Amendment's expansive 
language "or any other means" used to restrict future research beyond the technology in 1996 
supports an expansive reading of the statute. A broad interpretation of "research" under the 
120 § 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 803. 
121 HUGHES, supra note 62, at 407; OMNIBUS APPROPRIATIONS ACT, supra note 56. 
122 Sherley, supra note 68, at 14. 
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statu.te suggests that destruction ofhu.."'TI.&T} embryos in federally~ funded research violates the 
mandates of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, whether the destruction occurs as an upstream or 
downstream event to the actual, individual experiment being conducted. 
3. Whether an objective observer would believe the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment promotes religion 
Under the endorsement test, a "hypothetical reasonable observer" is presumed to be 
aware of the history of and the context of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment.123 A ~~hypothetical 
reasonable observer" would also recognize that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment bans federal 
funding for research that results in the destruction ofhuman embryos.124 Such an observer is 
presumed to know the two competing moral ideologies that stem from research involving 
destruction of human embryos. 125 
The first concerns the principle that moral life begins at conception, a belief widely held 
and advanced by Protestants and Roman Catholics.126 Such an observer would know destruction 
of an embryo or abortion of a non-viable fetus constitutes murder subject to this Christian 
principle. 127 The "hypothetical reasonable observer" would also know that proscribing federally 
funded researchers from destroying human embryos necessitates that researchers adhere to that 
Christian principle or risk losing their federal funding. 128 
The second ideology concerns public policy and recognizes the legal status of an embryo 
is not equal to that of a person such that it is morally wrong to hinder hESC research because of 
the enormous wealth in medical advances that may result from the research. 129 A "hypothetical 
123 See e.g. Modrovich, supra note 95, at 407. 
124 § 509(a)(2), supra note 4, at 803. 
125 MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 181. 
126 CHILDRESS, supra note 5, at 161-62. 
127 GREEN, supra note 38, at 225. 
128 See id. 
129 MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 181. 
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reasonable observer" would know that this ideology has an equal respect for human life as the 
first ideology. However, the focus of this respect is on undeniable people who are actually born 
and have real medical issues, not on embryos that may or may not develop into adults. 
Under the endorsement test, "hypothetical reasonable observer" would know the political 
underpinnings of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. Such an observer would recognize that the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment was authored by Protestant, Republican Representatives and 
supporte~ primarily by the Republic political party. 130 This "hypothetical reasonable observer" 
would also know that the Republican party has traditionally adopted a "pro-life" stance and a 
pro-Intelligent Design platform, largely because of the Christian values that the party has 
historically promoted. 131 
A "hypothetical reasonable observer" would recognize the public and cultural context at 
the time the Dickey-Wicker Amendment originated. This observer would recognize that the 
public response to the cloning of Dolly combined with the failure to distinguish between two 
very different meanings of "cloning" contributed to a political environment where legitimate 
scientific research was often con:flated with ''playing God." The observer would also know the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment was originally intended to be a rider provision effective for one year 
but that the Amendment has been attached to federal spending bills every year since 1996, 
essentially becoming a law without termination.132 
Last, a "hypothetical reasonable observer" would know that the plaintiffs in Sherley 
consisted of several Christian organizations and doctors. This observer would know that those 
130 See ROGER WICKER, supra note 110; REP. JAY DICKEY, supra note 110. 
131 See ON THE ISSUES, "Republican Party on Abortion," (last visited on Oct. 30, 2011) 
http://ontheissues.org/Celeb/Republican_Party _Abortion.htm; Huffington Post, "Where GOP Presidental 
Candidates Stand on Evolution," (last visited on Oct. 30, 2011) 
http://www .huffmgtonpost.com/20 11/08/24/20 12-election-gop-candidates-evo lution-
_n_934045.html#s333316&title=Rick_Perry 
132 COHEN, supra note 58, at 2. 
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largely because the plaintiffs felt the destruction of those embryos was immoral pursuant to their 
religious convictions.133 
4. Weighing the endorsement test factors 
All three factors of the endorsement test appear to weigh strongly against the 
constitutionality of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment. The Amendment's legislative history and 
historical context suggest that the Amendment was motivated by religion when enacted in 
response to scientific advances that some felt amounted to "playing God." The language of the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment requires federally funded researchers to adhere to the Christian 
principle that it is morally wrong to destroy human embryos for the sake of advancing science or 
risk losing their funding. 134 A "hypothetical reasonable observer" would recognize that religious 
beliefs motivated the history of the Amendment and that the Amendment advances a Christian 
belief. While Protestants and Roman Catholics generally hold that life begins at conception, 
those in the Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist faiths generally do not share this principle. 135 
In this regard, the Dickey-Wicker Amendment fails subject to constitutional analysis under the 
Establishment clause because it conveys a message of endorsement of Christianity, regardless of 
what the government's intent may have been behind the Amendment. 
No hypothetical reasonable observer can doubt that the purpose behind the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment is to protect embryos as ~'morally protectable human beings with the same 
legal claims upon us approaching those of others who are undisputed citizens (children and 
adults)."136 This purpose advances a Protestant and Roman Catholic principle that life begins at 
133 G REEN, supra note 38, at 225. 
134 MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 181. 
135 G REEN, supra note 38, at 226. 
136 ld. 
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conception and appears to express Government favoritism for Christianity over other faiths in 
violation of the Establishment Clause. 
B. Strict scrutiny analysis 
The Supreme Court has expressly required strict scrutiny analysis of violations of the 
Establishment Clause under the First Amendment.137 Subject to strict scrutiny analysis, the 
statute or policy at issue must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government purpose 
using the least restrictive means.138 If the statute or policy is either too broad or serves no 
compelling government purpose, then the statute is void.139 
Looking flrst to the purpose of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, application of the 
endorsement test lent considerable insight into the purpose of the Amendment. The 
"hypothetical reasonable person" analysis supports the argument that the purpose behind the 
Dickey-Wicker Amendment is to afford embryos with legal and moral protections approaching 
those of legally recognized people. This purpose advances the Christian belief that life begins at 
conception. Accepting this, the Government may argue that protecting human life (whether it 
consists of one cell or a billion) constitutes a secular and compelling government purpose and 
supports a belief held by many people of various faiths that destroying human embryos is 
immoral. Thus, prohibiting federal funding to research that destroys human embryos preserves 
the dignity of human life in support of this compelling purpose. 
Proponents ofhESC research, however, argue that the putative medical advances from 
hESC research would promote the very same purpose of protecting human life by providing 
cures for many of society's greatest ailments. The difference is that the protected human life is 
that of a legally recognized person. By contrast, embryos are not legally recognized as people 
137 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, supra note 88, at 608-09; Lynch, supra note 88, at 687. 
138 See Korematsu v. United States, 323, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
139 See id. 
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subject to the Supreme CoUt-t' s holding in Roe v. ¥1 ade and thus have no legally protected 
interests.140 One arguing against the Government's position would claim that it is hardly a 
compelling government interest to protect the interests of excess preimplantation embryos above 
the interests of the hundreds of thousands of people with diseases who may benefit from the 
expansion of stem cell lines for hESC research. 
Looking next to the construction of the Dickey-Wicker Amendment, the Amendment 
prohibits federally funding any research that results in the creation, destruction, or endangerment 
of human embryos. Currently, there are no widely accepted and utilized methods for derivation 
ofhESCs that do not result in the destruction of human embryos.141 There are alternative 
platforms, however, for obtaining stem cells without destroying human embryos. 142 The 
Government may argue that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment is narrowly-tailored because it does 
not prohibit hESC research; rather, the Amendment specifically prevents derivation ofhESC 
lines b~cause their derivation destroys embryos. 
The argument against the Government is that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment broadly 
hinders several forms of biological research because the Amendment is not specific to hESC 
research. It prohibits various forms of birth control research, IVF research, and birth defects 
research. 143 The Dickey-Wicker Amendment hinders hESC research, the ~~gold standard" of 
stem cell research platforms, by restricting the number of viable hESC lines available for 
American scientists. In this regard, proponents of hESC research may argue that the Amendment 
could be more narro-vvly tailored to prohibit the destruction of human embryos for a specific type 
of research. 
140 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a mother has a right to an abortion up 
until viability of the child, at which point the child becomes a legally protected person). 
141 See ZACHARIAS, supra note 9, at 635. 
142 Id. at 635-38. 
143 See THOMSON, supra note 1, at 1146. 
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The Amendment also broadly applies to all human embryos. Proponents ofhESC 
research may argue that the Amendment could be more narrowly tailored to allow for excess 
preimplantation embryos from IVF treatments that would ultimately be discarded anyway. The 
current NIH guidelines are strict in this regard, but the Dickey-Wicker Amendment is not. 
Congress might further refme the Amendment to allow only for the use of low quality embryos 
that are non-viable even if implanted in a healthy mother. Once an embryo is labeled as "poor 
quality'' at an IVF clinic, the embryo will be discarded. 144 In this regard, hESC research 
proponents might argue that once an embryo's destruction is determined for failing clinical 
standards, its destruction is no longer related to research and is, hence, less ethically 
worrisome.1-45 
V. CONCLUSION 
Application of the endorsement test supports the argument that the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment is unconstitutional as a violation of the Establishment Clause under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.146 Should the Dickey-Wicker Amendment be 
legally challenged, the court would analyze the Amendment subject to strict scrutiny because it 
may violate the fundamental, constitutional right that Government "shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion."147 Strict scrutiny analysis in this note suggests that the Dickey-
Wicker Amendment would fail both the "purpose" prong and "narrow construction" prong and 
be declared void as unconstitutional. The Government's hypothetical purpose arguments are not 
144 MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 181 (citing Paul H. Lerou, et al., Human Embryonic Stem Cell 
Derivation From Poor-Quality Embryos, 26 NATURE BIOTECH. 212,212 (2008) (defming "poor-quality" 
embryos as those designated ~'clinically useless based on poor morphology and a low likelihood of 
generating viable pregnancies" such that they are typically discarded as medical waste). 
145 !d. at 167 (citing Embryos discarded During IVF Create Stem Cell Lines, US NEWS, Jan. 28, 
2008 (describing how ~'poor quality" embryos may be valuable for hESC research purposes). 
146 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
147 /d. 
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baseless, but they are weak in that the result vvould effectively gr&"'lt h~~an embryos legally 
protectable status contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade that a legally 
recognized person is viable outside of the mother. Hence, human embryos outside of the mother 
are non-viable. The Government's argument that the Dickey-Wicker Amendment is narrowly 
tailored by the least restrictive means appears to fail, as well. The language of the Amendment 
could be more narrowly composed to restrict the destruction of embryos in the context of 
specific types of research rather than all research. Moreover, the language of the Amendment 
could be more narrowly composed to prohibit the destruction of only good quality embryos only. 
Under a more narrow construction, poor quality embryos that would be discarded by IVF clinics 
and not develop even if implanted in a mother could be permitted for use in research that may 
cause their destruction. 
The effect of this analysis suggests that a religious principle disputing the moral 
protection of embryos and fetuses as human beings has "driven 30 years of research obstruction, 
with serious negative impact on the lives and health of those who are undeniably citizens."148 As 
ofNovember 2011, there are over 225,000 undeniable United States citizens waiting for organ 
transplants, but only a small portion of those people will actually receive the organ they 
require. 149 Immune responses in organ recipients triggered by foreign cells and tissue often 
result in the body's rejection of the transplanted tissue or organ, resulting in a fairly low recovery 
rate of approximately 50%.150 Human embryonic stem cell-based techniques have the potential 
to "provide doctors with a renewable source of healthy cells and tissues to repair failing 
148 ld. 
149 Data, U.S. DEPARTl\tlENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK (Nov. 30,2011,9:30 PM) http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data. 
150 See MCGUIRE, supra note 3, at 161. 
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organs."151 Recently, preliminary results from a phase 1 trial suggest that infusion of cardiac 
stem cells into heart attack victims improves heart function and reduces infarct size in patients 
with heart failure. 152 Unfortunately, it appears that hESC research has been unconstitutionally 
stymied since the inception of the technology in 1998 because of the restrictions imposed by the 
Dickey-Wicker amendment. Proponents ofhESC research contend that this obstruction has 
subjected countless women "to infertility drug treatments whose safety has been inadequately 
studied by means of appropriate multi-center clinical trials" and that "children born from these 
procedures have been exposed to inadequately researched risks."153 
Ultimately, it appears that the religious convictions of a few have driven public policy in 
this arena, -leaving us to speculate about how many countless lives might have been saved by 
medical advances that would have resulted had hESC research and other reproductive research 
received the full support of government legislation and unrestricted federal funding. The analysis 
presented here suggests that Congress should either restrict the language of the Dickey-Wicker 
Amendment or remove the Amendment entirely. In its current form, one could certainly legally 
challenge the Amendment as unconstitutional and would likely succeed in doing so. 
151 Id. 
152 Roberto Bolli, M.D., et al., Cardiac stem cells in patients with ischaemic cardiomyopathy 
(SCIPIO): initial results of a randomized phase 1 trial, 378 THE LANCET 1847 (2011) (discussing a 
summary of the study fmdings ). 
153 GREEN, supra note 38, at 226. 
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